Slovenian daoist temple of supreme harmony
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Rektor SDT, Jure Čeh Daozhang | 21 November 2026

On Difference, Tolerance and Hatred

Rektorjeva beseda

At the Slovenian Daoist Temple of Supreme Harmony, we see inquiry and the exchange of ideas as an important part of our life together. Reflection can grow out of the study of classical texts, research, or organized gatherings. It often begins, too, in our conversations and correspondence, in the questions we ask ourselves and one another, and in the different views we share along the way.

We welcome such correspondence because it allows us to look at a subject from several sides, think it through again, and sometimes raise questions we might never have asked on our own. One such exchange prompted me to reflect on how Daoism understands ideological intolerance, tolerance, and hatred of those who think differently.

In the meantime, on the recommendation of the woman I was corresponding with, I also read Komelj’s short prose piece “Svetnikove solze.” Miklavž Komelj approaches his subject with erudition. His prose is expansive, sumptuous, and rich in meaning, and he gives the story a powerful emotional arc. My own reading is above all a quixotic one. I read it as a factual account of the decline of the geocentric world of Aristotle and Ptolemy on which medieval theology had rested. Robert Bellarmine was a tragic figure in this transition, one he had already sensed in the wake of Copernicus’s *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, libri VI* (1543). As Copernicus began to undermine the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmos, Bellarmine belonged to the generation that had to reckon with the consequences. At the trial of Giordano Bruno, he was one of the theologians who examined Bruno’s teachings and formulated theological objections. He took part in the proceedings that ended with Bruno’s condemnation and his handover to the secular authorities, who burned him at the stake in 1600. Bellarmine died in 1621, and the Catholic Church canonized him in 1930.

This is why I read “Svetnikove solze” differently. For me, it tells of the private uncertainty, distress, and possible guilt of a man who took part in institutional proceedings that led to the execution of the Dominican friar Giordano Bruno. Galileo Galilei might have followed Bruno’s path. In 1616, Bellarmine took part in proceedings concerning Copernicus’s teaching and issued Galileo a certificate recording how the Church authorities had dealt with him at the time. It was only on June 22, 1633, more than a decade after Bellarmine’s death, that the Inquisition pronounced its second judgment against Galileo. The Catholic Church formally settled the debate over Copernicus’s teaching only in 1820, when it approved the printing of a work by Giuseppe Settele. John Paul II explicitly addressed this historical question in 1992. Other details of the story are also of interest. Galileo did indeed go blind in the last years of his life. His sight began to deteriorate rapidly in 1637. By the end of that year he was almost completely blind, and in 1638 the Inquisition reported on his blindness and poor health.

The emphasis in *Vrt brez vzhoda* lies elsewhere. What matters there is the factual record of cruelty toward people who thought differently, as distinct from the emotional response to historical events. The text deliberately avoids passing explicit judgments, moralizing, or telling readers how to understand a particular historical event, person, or action. Particularly when writing about violence, religious intolerance, the persecution of dissenters, and acts of cruelty in history, I generally want to set out the circumstances and the facts and let them carry their own weight.

This is why I sometimes leave a person unnamed when the story can be told without the name. I refer to Galileo indirectly, for instance, as “the Stargazer.” Nor do I explain who was on the “right” or “wrong” side of history. Bellarmine appears as a man dressed in scarlet, and I leave judgment on his historical role open. I trust capable readers to draw connections between events and form judgments of their own. This is also what I mean when I say that the book has several layers. It has to do with the very nature of Vrt brez vzhoda. I conceived the book as a work of literature and philosophy, distinct from a historical treatise, a polemic, or a moral argument. Different historical, religious, and philosophical experiences meet in it, with no single interpretation laid down in advance.

On ideological intolerance

This very question came up in one of our conversations. What do early Chinese thought and Daoist texts actually say about ideological intolerance and hostility toward someone who thinks differently?

This is one of the questions at the heart of Vrt brez vzhoda. The book puts it to the reader chiefly through specific historical cases and through the social climates in which intolerance of dissent came to be taken for granted. Vrt explores the question across different periods and settings. It considers Hypatia and her murder in the social climate of Alexandria at the time, the burning of Giordano Bruno and the repudiation of Galileo Galilei in the religious and social setting of their day, the herem, or expulsion, of Baruch Spinoza from Amsterdam’s Jewish community, and the ban on Karl Jaspers’s work and his dismissal from Heidelberg University because his wife, Gertrud Mayer, was Jewish.

These cases differ greatly, and I have no wish to equate them. What interests me is how the same human response recurs in different historical, religious, and social settings. There comes a moment when a community decides that a different way of thinking, a different belief, or someone’s very existence is something to be excluded, silenced, or removed. I see this happening in Europe today. Even within the European Union, we can see how people begin to be labeled, excluded, or discredited for the positions they hold, for speaking publicly, or for seeing things differently. Cases such as those of Glenn Diesen, Ghassan Hage, Francesca Albanese, Beti Hohler, Jacques Baud, Tomaž Mastnak, and others interest me precisely because they bring the question out of the past and into our own time. Whether we agree with a given person’s views matters less to me here than a more fundamental question. What happens to a society when disagreement itself begins to count as grounds for exclusion? 

To put the question a little more broadly, what do early Chinese thinkers and their teachings actually say about ideological intolerance and hostility toward someone who thinks differently?

I think Daoism has no doctrine of “tolerance” in the contemporary sense of the word. It approaches the subject in other terms. Chapter 67 of the Daode jing presents three treasures as virtues a person might cultivate.

我有三寶,持而保之:一曰慈,二曰儉,三曰不敢為天下先。

“I have three treasures that I hold fast to and guard. The first is compassion (cí 慈), the second is modesty or restraint (jiǎn 儉), and the third is that I do not presume to put myself first under Heaven (bù gǎn wéi tiānxià xiān 不敢為天下先).”

The Daode jing gives no instruction to “be tolerant of those who think differently.” It suggests an attitude toward oneself and others that makes the urge to dominate another person less likely to arise. 

The passage continues.

夫慈,故能勇;儉,故能廣;不敢為天下先,故能成器長。

“It is compassion that enables a person to be brave, and modesty that enables them to be generous. By declining to put themselves first under Heaven, they can earn the trust of others.”

That last thought seems especially important to me here. When we refrain from making ourselves the measure of all things or claiming a position from which to dictate how others should think, live, or believe, we leave less room for a particular kind of intolerance. It treats someone who differs from us first as mistaken, then as unwelcome, and finally as someone who must be removed.

One of Zhuangzi’s insights is that we tend to experience our own view as self-evidently right. When we turn our own shì 是 (“this is so”) into a universal standard and set fēi 非 (“this is not so”) against it, we can go on drawing distinctions, affirming ourselves, and dismissing others indefinitely. Zhuangzi turns the question back on the way we make judgments at all, leaving open the question of which side is right.

This is why the chapter Qiwu lun 齊物論, a discussion of the equalizing of things, or of different perspectives, seems so important to me here. We can recognize the limits of our own perspective without assuming that all claims are equally true. A person who is utterly certain of possessing the ultimate standard is already close to declaring someone who differs from them mistaken, dangerous, or even less than human.

The Daode jing places the emphasis a little differently. Its chief concern here is the forcible imposition of an order that someone has first decided is right. Wuwei 無為 thus means both acting without forcing things and relinquishing the use of force to make the world and other people conform to our idea of how they ought to be.

 

From the Dao to external norms

In chapter 38 of the Daode jing, Laozi describes a gradual departure from the Dao, a movement from an inner, spontaneous order toward increasingly external rules and forms of conduct. The chapter opens with this thought.

上德不德,是以有德;下德不失德,是以無德。

“The highest de makes no claim to virtue, and for that very reason possesses it. Lower de clings to virtue, and for that very reason lacks it.” (At its highest, efficacy is unaware of itself as virtue, and for that very reason possesses virtue. At a lower level, efficacy clings to virtue, and for that very reason lacks it.)

The following sequence comes next.

失道而後德,失德而後仁,失仁而後義,失義而後禮。

“When the Dao is lost, virtue (de) arises. When virtue is lost, humaneness (ren) arises. When humaneness is lost, righteousness (yi) arises. When righteousness is lost, ritual propriety (li) arises.”

This sequence of ethical and social concepts also points to a process. External norms and prescribed forms of conduct gradually take the place of the spontaneous, immediate order of human relationships. Once a particular idea of virtue, humaneness, righteousness, or ritual becomes a binding standard for everyone, someone can use it to assert their own authority. Those who decide what is virtuous, just, or right can also claim the right to decide who deserves to belong and who is a deviant, who may speak and who must remain silent. At that point, the imposition of external norms can become a means of manipulation and an abuse of power. Ethical principles, laws, and rituals pose no inherent problem. The question is what happens when their outward form displaces their inner substance and becomes an instrument of power.

Interestingly, this is also where we encounter the concept of hé 和, or harmony. Daoist harmony has little to do with sameness or uniformity. I feel much closer to the formulation hé ér bù tóng 和而不同, to be in harmony without all being alike. Difference in itself poses no problem. The problem arises when one way of being different demands that another disappear.

Here, to my mind, lies the essential difference between a Daoist outlook and ideological thinking. Ideology often needs to draw lines between those who are right and those who are wrong, between those who belong and those who do not, between what one is allowed to think and what is forbidden. The Daoist tradition is deeply wary of treating any one perspective as absolute. Its wariness owes little to being “liberal” or to defending freedom of speech in the modern sense. It comes from seeing the human need for absolute certainty as a source of many conflicts.

Hu Shi on why freedom depends on tolerance

In modern Chinese thought, Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962) addresses tolerance very directly. He appears in Vrt brez vzhoda at precisely the point where the question of tolerance arises. While Laozi offers a deeper starting point for understanding why we should refrain from imposing our own standard on others, Hu Shi develops the idea that tolerance is the foundation of freedom in his essay Rongren yu ziyou 〈容忍與自由〉 (Tolerance and Freedom).

He writes as follows.

我自己也有「年紀越大,越覺得容忍比自由還更重要」的感想。有時我竟覺得容忍是一切自由的根本:沒有容忍,就沒有自由。

“I too have come to feel that the older I grow, the more important tolerance seems to me, even more important than freedom. Sometimes I even think that tolerance is the foundation of all freedoms. Without tolerance there is no freedom.”

He goes on.

一切對異端的迫害,一切對「異己」的摧殘,一切宗教自由的禁止,一切思想言論的被壓迫,都由於這一點深信自己是不會錯的心理。

“All persecution of heretics, all repression of dissenters, all prohibitions on religious freedom, and all suppression of freedom of thought and expression spring from the conviction that we ourselves cannot be wrong.”

This thought matters a great deal to the question we are considering. It goes beyond the need to allow different opinions and draws attention to the psychological certainty that can lead people to believe they have the right to silence or exclude someone else. Freedom can remain a right that an individual claims for themselves. Tolerance also asks something of us in our dealings with another person. We can disagree with someone and still acknowledge their right to be different.

 

On hatred and feeling threatened

When it comes to hatred, I would go a step further. Hatred of someone who is different is more than a powerful emotion. It often begins with a sense of being threatened. We start to see difference as a threat to our identity, our values, our sense of belonging, or our understanding of the world. We begin by defining the other person as someone who ought to have no place in our version of the world. Once we have done so, their very presence comes to seem threatening, and we may feel justified in erasing what makes them different.

Daoism offers a different way of looking at this process and a path of individual self-cultivation, though it offers no political solutions to it. Zhuangzi would probably begin by asking what happens to our own perspective the moment we are absolutely certain we are right. In the chapter already mentioned, Qiwu lun  齊物論, he draws attention to the opposition between shì 是 and fēi 非, between what we declare to be right and what we dismiss as wrong. His criticism extends beyond differences of opinion to our treatment of people who do not accept our standards. Once we declare our own idea of the good to be the only valid one, we may begin to despise someone who differs from us, treat them as inferior, or deny them the chance to live in their own way.

Karyn Lai also draws attention to this aspect in her article “Contempt, Withdrawal and Equanimity in the Zhuangzi” (2023). She examines Zhuangzi’s critique of the antagonism between different philosophical perspectives and of the hostility and contempt that arise when individuals or groups declare their own understanding of the good life to be the only correct one.

Hatred, then, need not begin as hatred. Most often it begins with a sense of being threatened, or with the stoking of that feeling. Then we begin to sort people into those who are right and those who are wrong, the acceptable and the unacceptable, those we count as our own and those we see as outsiders. When authorities, institutions, or communities lend their support to such distinctions, they can become a means of exclusion, manipulation, and violence.

Daoism does not ask us to accept every action or give up our own judgment. We can accept someone’s difference while disapproving of things they do. Above all, it means recognizing their human worth and their right to exist even when they do not fit our conception of the world.

 

Difference as a space for living together

When I bring together Lao Zi’s three treasures, his warning about replacing the Dao with external norms, Zhuangzi’s critique of rigid distinctions, and Hu Shi’s understanding of tolerance, I find a thought they share. The very moment when we feel most certain we are right is the moment to take care.

Perhaps one of the more important tasks of religious and philosophical inquiry is to keep examining our own understanding and the limits of our certainty.

Vrt brez vzhoda also takes up these questions. It places historical instances of violence, persecution, and exclusion in different settings and periods, without trying to fit them all into a single pattern or deciding in advance how the reader should judge them. Its purpose is to give readers room to reflect for themselves, leaving the question open to more than one answer.

Jure Čeh / Yuan Weiqi (袁微琪) 

Rector of the Slovenian Daoist Temple of Supreme Harmony